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ORIGINALISM AND THE
DESEGREGATION DECISIONS-A
RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR McCONNELL
Earl M. Maltz*
In Originalism and the Desegregation Decisionsi Professor
Michael W. McConnell makes a bold effort to justify Brown v.
Board of Education2 in terms of originalist theory. Unlike commentators who have previously dealt with this issue, Professor
McConnell does not focus his primary attention on the period
from 1866 to 1868-the time in which the Fourteenth Amendment itself was drafted and ratified. Rather, he argues that the
treatment of Sen. Charles Sumner's Civil Rights Bill in the 1870s
suggests that at that time Republicans generally believed that the
Fourteenth Amendment outlawed segregated schools. He further maintains that Republican attitudes in the 1870s should be
considered authoritative evidence of the original understanding.
The article bears many of the characteristics that have made
Professor McConnell one of our leading constitutional scholars.
Meticulously researched and carefully argued, the article adds
greatly to our understanding of the doctrinal arguments that surrounded the desegregation issue in the 1870s, as well as the political dynamic that resulted in the elimination of the school-related
provisions from the Civil Rights Act of 1875.3 Unfortunately,
however, Professor McConnell fails in his attempt to demonstrate that the decision in Brown is consistent with the original
understanding.
Refutation of Professor McConnell's argument is a two step
process. The first step is to explain why congressional treatment
of the school desegregation issue in the 1870s does not demonstrate that the original understanding was that the Fourteenth
Amendment outlawed school desegregation. The second step is
to show that other historical evidence indicates that the framers
*
I.

2.
3.

Distinguished Professor of Law, Rutgers (Camden).
81 Va. L. Rev. 947 ( 1995).
347 u.s. 483 (1954).
183 Stat. 335 (1875).
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did not believe that they were forbidding states from maintaining
segregated schools.
I.

CONGRESSIONAL TREATMENT OF SUMNER'S
CIVIL RIGHTS BILL DOES NOT NECESSARILY
SUPPORT THE VIEW THAT BROWN
WAS RIGHTLY DECIDED

The use of the congressional treatment of Sumner's Civil
Rights Bill to support Brown in originalist terms faces two separate problems. The first problem is doctrinal: while Brown dealt
with the impact of the Fourteenth Amendment per se on school
segregation, the issue in the debate on the Civil Rights Act was
whether Congress had the power to require public schools to be
desegregated. The second problem is temporal: the Civil Rights
Act was not considered and adopted until several years after the
Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, and political conditions had
changed substantially in the interim.
THE DOCTRINAL PROBLEM

The constitutional issue that was debated in the 1870s was
whether Congress had the power to order school desegregation
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. This question is
analytically distinct from that of whether Section 1 by its terms
requires desegregation (although the two issues obviously are related). Moreover, there is substantial reason to believe that at
least some Republicans understood this distinction and knew
that they were dealing only with the Section 5 issue.
As Professor McConnell notes, Republican Rep. William
Lawrence of Ohio enunciated the basic constitutional theory underlying the provisions of the Civil Rights Bill that dealt with
schools. Lawrence argued that "[w]hen the States by law create
and protect, and by taxation on the property of all support, benevolent institutions designed to care for those who need their
benefits, the dictates of humanity require that equal provision
should be made for all."4 This theory-also cited by Republican
Senators Oliver H. P. T. Morton and John Sherman as the justification for including public education in the Civil Rights Billsdraws its support from antebellum legal authorities defining the
scope of the right to protection of the laws. In relevant part,
these authorities did not rely on either a particular distaste for
4.
5.

2 Con g. Rec. 412 ( 1874).
Cong. Globe, 42d Cong .. 2d Sess. 3190-93 (1872).
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racial classifications or an assessment of the importance of particular government benefits. Rather, they were based on the view
that where a class of people was taxed to support a given benefit
and then denied access to that benefit, that class was, in essence,
subject to an uncompensated taking and, as such, denied the
right to protection from government.6
This doctrine played an important role in the 1860 Senate
debate over the funding of education in the District of Columbia.
As initially proposed, the bill before the Senate provided simply
that the city authorities could impose a general property tax to
benefit the public schools in the District and that the federal government would provide matching funds of up to $25,000 per year.
Senate Republicans pressed for an amendment that would have
required the city government to use at least part of the funds to
educate blacks as well as whites. One of the mainstays of the
Republican argument was the contention that "taxing [blacks] to
support schools for the exclusive benefit of the white children ...
would be a kind of legal robbery"?-a clear reference to the principles of the state taxation cases. At the same time, however, the
limitations of the doctrine became clear when Republican Daniel
Clark, the sponsor of the amendment to require that blacks be
admitted to the schools, stated that he would accept exclusion of
free blacks so long as they were exempted from the property tax
and their pro rata share of the federal contribution was
withheld.B
John Sherman, one of the most prominent Republicans in
the Senate, took a similarly limited view of the scope of the right
protected. In 1872, Sherman stated that he viewed the maintenance of segregated schools as constitutional, so long as the black
schools received their pro rata share of school funding.9 Yet, the
next day, Sherman voted against the Blair amendment, which
would have specifically reserved to local governments the right to
maintain segregated schools.w How can one explain this seeming anomaly?
The simplest answer lies in the Republican conception of the
scope of the Section 5 enforcement authority. Many regular
Republicans embraced the view of congressional power expressed by Chief Justice John Marshall in McCulloch v. Mary6. The development of this theory is described in detail in Earl M. Maltz, Fourteenth Amendment Concepts in the Antebellum Era, 32 Am. 1. Legal Hist. 305 (1988).
7. Cong. Globe, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. 1681 (1860).
8. Id. at 1680.
9. Cong. Globe, 42d Cong .. 2d Sess. 3193 (1872).
10. Id. at 3263.
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land: "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the
constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are not
prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutionai."n Under this view, Congress clearly
would have authority to prohibit some actions that would not be
prohibited by the Constitution itself. This point was made by
Republicans a number of times in the debate over the Civil
Rights Act of 1875. Thus, for example, Rep. Robert Hale of New
York explicitly relied on McCulloch in arguing that passage of
the Civil Rights Act would not be inconsistent with the Supreme
Court's decision in The Slaughter-House Cases.12 Lawrence also
relied on McCulloch in his defense of the Civil Rights Bill, declaring that "Congress ... is the exclusive judge of the proper
means to employ" in guaranteeing the rights secured by the
Fourteenth Amendmentt3 and that "[a] remedial power in the
Constitution is to be construed liberally."t4
Against this background, the apparent inconsistencies in
Sherman's position can be reconciled. School segregation might
not be unconstitutional per se; however, the Civil Rights Bill
might still be constitutional under the McCulloch view of congressional power as a device to guarantee that blacks would in
fact receive equal financial support in return for their tax dollars
or (as Sherman apparently believed) as a means to advance the
Reconstruction process generally.1s In neither case would a vote
for the school desegregation provisions of the Civil Rights Bill
support the conclusion that Brown was rightly decided under
originalist theory.
Of course, as Professor McConnell clearly demonstrates, a
number of Republicans disagreed with Sherman and argued that
Section 1 by its terms outlawed school segregation. Even those
statements, however, are suspect from an originalist perspective.
Republican pronouncements on constitutional issues in the 1870s
are a demonstrably unreliable guide to the original understanding in the period from 1866 to 1868, when the Fourteenth
Amendment was drafted and ratified.

11. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,421 (1819).
12. 3 Cong. Rec. 980 (1875), discussing Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36
(1872).
13. 2 Cong. Rec. 414 (1874).
14. ld. at 412, citing Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 476 (1793).
15. Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 3192-93 (1872).
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THE TEMPORAL PROBLEM

As Reconstruction progressed, regular Republicans showed
a clear willingness to move beyond the strictures of the Fourteenth Amendment in adopting civil rights measures of nationwide applicability. In pure policy terms, the evolution of the
Republican position on the issue of black suffrage provides one
striking example. During the drafting of the Fourteenth Amendment itself, party regulars explicitly rejected a provision that
would have required the states to allow blacks to vote; moreover,
they specifically noted their rejection of the black suffrage provision in the committee report accompanying the proposed amendment.t6 Only three years later, by contrast, Republicans united
to pass the Fifteenth Amendment, which required states to adopt
race-blind qualifications for voting.
For purposes of evaluating Professor McConnell's argument,
the evolution of the Republican position on jury service is even
more compelling. A section prohibiting racial discrimination in
jury selection was included in the Civil Rights Act of 1875,t7 with
Republicans citing the equal protection clause as the source of
authority for this provision.tR Moreover, Republican support for
the jury selection provision was no less overwhelming than the
support for the school provisions; for example, in 1872, an effort
to delete the protection for jury service from the Sumner bill was
defeated 33-16; among Republicans, only James L. Alcorn of
Mississippi, Arthur I. Boreman of West Virginia, Matthew H.
Carpenter of Wisconsin, and John A. Logan of Illinois supported
the motion.t9
Given this background, the same argument that supports
Professor McConnell's position on the issue of racially segregated schools would also suggest that, as originally understood by
its framers, the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited states from
excluding free blacks from juries. However, a wide variety of
commentators, including Professor McConnell himself, have concluded that in the late 1860s it was generally conceded by all parties that the Fourteenth Amendment had no impact on political
16. Report of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. xiii
(1866).
17. 183 Stat. 335 (1875).
18. The evolution of the jury selection provision is described in detail in Earl M.
Maltz, The Civil Rights Act and the Civil Rights Cases: Congress, Court, and Constitution,
44 Fla. L. Rev. 605, 623-26 (1992).
19. Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 3263 (1872).
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rights, including the right to serve on juries.zo Thus, the jury service provision stands as a clear example of a case in which regular Republicans of the 1870s were willing to seize on the
Fourteenth Amendment as a source of authority for congressional action that went beyond the original understanding of the
Amendment. There is no particular reason to believe that the
school desegregation provision would have stood on any more
secure footing.
Despite these problems, if the discussions of Sumner's Civil
Rights Bill were the only available evidence, one might well
conclude that Brown was defensible in originalist terms. A
variety of other evidence, however, suggests strongly that segregated schools would have been permitted under the original
understanding.
II. THE ORIGINALIST CASE AGAINST BROWN
The originalist case against Brown rests on two different arguments. First, a direct constitutional attack on segregated
schools was unthinkable in the period in which the Fourteenth
Amendment was drafted, passed, and ratified. Second, the doctrinal structure of Section 1 is inconsistent with the view that it
was originally understood to prohibit the maintenance of segregated schools.
SCHOOL SEGREGATION AND THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT

As Professor McConnell notes, school segregation was common in the Northern states during the period in which the Fourteenth Amendment was drafted and ratified. Segregation was
particularly prevalent in the states of the lower North-the pivotal battleground states in the national elections. Thus, any direct, broad-based effort to attack segregated schools would have
carried with it substantial political risks.
The moderate Republicans who controlled the drafting of
the Fourteenth Amendment were disinclined to take such risks.
The amendment was in large measure a campaign document,
designed to outline the Republican program of Reconstruction
for the upcoming elections of 1866.21 As such, all of its provisions-including Section 1-were carefully drafted to appeal to
20. McConnell, 81 Va. L. Rev. at 1024 (cited in note 1). See also Maltz, 44 Fla. L.
Rev. at 623-26 (cited in note 18).
21. The political maneuvering surrounding the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment is described in detail in Michael Les Benedict, A Compromise of Principle: Congres-
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swing voters in the post-Civil War electorate. As part of their
strategy, mainstream Republicans repeatedly assured those voters that Section 1 would have only a minimal impact on Northern
state laws-a claim they could not make if Section 1 had been
generally understood to outlaw segregated schools.
The congressional treatment of the District of Columbia
school system underscores the unwillingness of Republicans in
the 39th Congress to attack school segregation. Issues of federalism did not constrain congressional action dealing with the District of Columbia; thus, on issues such as streetcar segregation,
voting rights, and jury service, mainstream Republicans in Congress acted to protect the rights of free blacks in the District well
in advance of the passage of nationally applicable measures. By
contrast, contemporaneously with the Fourteenth Amendment,
the same Republicans continued to support the segregated
school system in the District of Columbia.zz To contend that
Republicans would at the same time knowingly act against school
segregation by a nationally applicable constitutional amendment
is to attribute to them an almost Orwellian mentality.
In short, contextual evidence strongly suggests that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment did not believe that they were
outlawing segregation in public schools. In theory, however, they
might have inadvertently adopted language that would have
made such segregation illegal under then-applicable rules of legal
interpretation. Thus, the originalist case against Brown ultimately depends on a doctrinal analysis of Section 1.
THE DOCTRINAL ARGUMENT

As Professor McConnell correctly observes, the critical doctrinal question is whether the privileges or immunities clause of
Section 1 would have been understood to prohibit the maintenance of segregated schools.zJ By its terms, this provision does
not outlaw discrimination of any particular type; instead, it defines a set of rights that are brought under federal protection by
the Fourteenth Amendment. At the very least, states are prohibited from using race as a criterion for limiting those rights.
In defining the scope of the privileges or immunities clause,
Professor McConnell focuses his attention on the Reconstruction-era distinction between civil rights, which were protected by
sional Republicans and Reconstruction, 1863-1869, (W.W. Norton, 1974); Eric McKitrick,
Andrew Johnson and Reconstruction (U. of Chicago Press, 1960).
22. E.g., Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 708-09 (1866).
23. McConnell, 81 Va. L. Rev. at 998-1005 (cited in note 1).
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the privileges or immunities clause, and social and political
rights, which were outside the coverage of the Fourteenth
Amendment.24 These terms did, indeed, figure prominently in
the debate over the Civil Rights Act of 186(}2s and the Fourteenth Amendment itself. However, Professor McConnell fails
to note that another dichotomy was also critical in the Republican taxonomy of rights-the distinction between rights inherent
in national citizenship and "local" rights, which were creatures of
state law.
A number of prominent Republicans in the 39th Congress
drew clear distinctions between the two sets of rights; for example, Rep. William Lawrence of Ohio declared that "all privileges
and immunities are of two kinds, to wit, those which [are] inherent in every citizen of the United States, and such others as may
be conferred by local law and pertain only to the citizen of the
State."26 The same distinction is reflected in the structure of the
Fourteenth Amendment itself. Section 1 refers to both state citizenship and national citizenship; the privileges or immunities
clause, by contrast, protects only those rights associated with national citizenship-in other words "those which [are] inherent in
every citizen of the United States," rather than simply "conferred
by locallaw."z7
Even when considered in the abstract, the right to a free
public education fits comfortably into the mold of a right "conferred by local law and pertain[ing] only to the citizen of the
State. "zs Unlike, for example, the right to contract and to be free
from bodily restraint, it cannot be viewed as a natural right which
preexisted the establishment of governments. Unlike the right to
hold real property, it is not the byproduct of allegiance to a federal government with sovereign authority. Instead, public education is a creation of state government, supported by the local
taxation for the benefit of its own citizenry. As such, access to
public education is the quintessential example of a right dependent on state rather than national citizenship and is thus outside
the protection of the privileges or immunities clause.
This conclusion is bolstered by the status of public education
under the privileges and immunities clause of Article IV-the
comity clause. John A. Bingham, the author of Section 1, explic24. Id. at 1014-29.
25. 14 Stat. 27 (1866 ).
26. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1836 (1866). See also, e.g., id. at 600 (remarks of Sen. Trumbull); id. at app. 293 (remarks of Rep. Shellabarger).
27. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1836 (1866).
28. ld.
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itly identified the comity clause as the source of the privileges or
immunities language and, differentiating between state and national citizenship, identified the rights protected as the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States.29 The identity between the comity clause and the privileges or immunities language of Section 1 was recognized by many other mainstream
Republicans as well.Jo
Against this background, the proper analysis of the privileges or immunities clause of Section 1 emerges rather clearly.
The rights protected by the clause are rights of national citizenship, which in turn are identical with those that states must grant
to sojourners from other states under the comity clause. While
the nature of these rights might be unclear at the margins, the
right to attend public schools is rather clearly not included. Few
(if any) constitutional scholars would claim that a child from
state A, visiting for one week in state B, would have a right
under the comity clause to attend the public schools of state B
during his visit. Thus, since the rights guaranteed by the two
privileges and immunities clauses were understood to be coextensive, citizens of state B similarly cannot claim the right to attend desegregated schools under the privileges or immunities
clause of Section 1.
In short, both the historical context and the doctrinal structure of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment work against
Professor McConnell's effort to defend Brown in originalist
terms. Admittedly, by 1875 (or even by 1872) a substantial
number of Republicans who had voted in favor of the Fourteenth
Amendment may have honestly believed that the Constitution
outlawed racially-segregated schools. However, the weight of
the historical evidence indicates that those who drafted and ratified the Fourteenth Amendment did not share that understanding during the earlier Reconstruction period.

29. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 158, 1034 (1866).
30. Jd. at 1054 (remarks of Rep. Higby); id. at 1095 (remarks of Rep. Hotchkiss).
While Bingham himself viewed the rights protected by the first eight amendments as protected by the comity clause as well, Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 84 (1871 ), Sen.
Jacob Howard of Michigan argued that the privileges or immunities clause of Section 1
protected them in addition to those rights protected by the comity clause. Cong. Globe,
39th Cong, 1st Sess. 2765 (1866). Even if one were to adopt Howard's view, it would not
materially change the analysis.

